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ABSTRACT: European water governance is characterised by processes of interplay and interaction. Member states 
present and discuss their preferences and expertise in the EU policy arena and implement EU policies at the 
domestic level. These processes of 'uploading' and 'downloading' are regularly studied. However, a knowledge gap 
exists concerning the 'reloading' of implementation experiences, i.e. the renewed uploading of information on how 
policies actually work domestically and how possible implementation problems are solved. Certain characteristics 
of EU policies are expected to affect processes of reloading. In this paper we study how adaptation pressures and 
the levels of policy discretion affect the reloading of implementation experiences. We empirically assess reloading 
processes in the EU Water Framework Directive and the EU Floods Directive. It was expected that a low level of 
policy discretion leads to clear reloading incentives, in order to either change the policy (if fit is low and adaptation 
pressure is high) or maintain stability (if fit is high and adaptation pressure is low). A high degree of policy discretion, 
on the other hand, leads to no incentive at all for reloading. The relatively specific Water Framework Directive 
indeed shows cases of reloading in which implementing agents discuss their rather technical implementation 
experiences in order to adjust policy or to maintain the status quo in line with their interests. However, it is notable 
that reloading also takes place in the relatively discretionary policy process of the Floods Directive. Reloading in this 
case is driven by social learning, and is triggered by the idealistic aim of improving flood risk management practices 
instead of changing or maintaining the policy on the basis of self-interest. The paper concludes that policy discretion 
and adaptation pressure do influence reloading processes, but that other factors also must be taken into account. 
 
KEYWORDS: Policy implementation, policy feedback, EU Water Framework Directive, EU Floods Directive, policy 
characteristics, reloading, EU water governance, EU policy process, European Union 
INTRODUCTION 
Water governance is a multilevel, multi-actor and multi-sector domain, since water challenges cross 
spatial, administrative and sectoral borders (Molle, 2008; Mostert, 2006; Warner, 2006). In Europe, 
agents operating at municipal, regional, national and supranational levels are concerned with the 
governance of water issues (Moss and Newig, 2010). The EU Water Framework Directive (WFD) and the 
EU Floods Directive (FD) are examples of multilevel water governance policies that aim to harmonise 
water quality and flood risk practices across the EU. Both are formulated and decided upon at the EU 
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level. The European Commission has the formal mandate to initiate policy proposals which must be 
approved by both the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. Member states must then 
implement these policies at the domestic level. Multilateral collaboration on implementation of these 
policies also takes place at the catchment level in river basin commissions. The different levels interact, 
exchanging knowledge, information and expertise. 
Figure 1. Uploading, downloading and reloading in the EU policy process. 
 
Within multilevel interactions, a distinction can be made between processes of uploading, downloading 
and reloading (Figure 1). Uploading and downloading are well-known concepts used in studies on the 
relationships between the EU and its member states (Börzel, 2002; Kaika and Page, 2003; Liefferink et al., 
2011; Page and Kaika, 2003). Member states and interest groups try to shape EU policy outcomes by 
uploading their policy ideas and preferences to different actors involved in agenda-setting, policy 
formulation and decision-making, particularly to the European Commission, other members states and 
the European Parliament. Kaika and Page (2003), for instance, studied the uploading processes that 
resulted in the establishment of the Water Framework Directive (WFD). Once formulated, these EU 
policies are 'downloaded' to the domestic level during the stages of transposition and implementation 
(see Andersen and Liefferink, 1997; Börzel, 2002; Liefferink et al., 2011), during which member states and 
national implementing agencies must accordingly change their regulations and policies. Very often, 
uploading and downloading are either investigated separately or conceptualised as straightforward 
processes (Breeman and Zwaan, 2009). However, both legal transposition and practical implementation 
are political and iterative processes (Mastenbroek and Kaeding, 2006). 
During processes of practical implementation, subnational agents acquire experiences about how 
policies work out at the street level and how implementation problems can be effectively solved. 
Implementation experiences are conceptualised by van Eerd et al. (2018) as "all the information and 
expertise acquired by implementing agents like municipalities or regional water authorities during, or as 
the result of the practical implementation of policies". These implementing agents are professional 
organisations formally charged with the practical implementation of a specific policy or policy instrument 
(van Eerd et al., 2018). Practical implementation experiences might trigger policy feedback and influence 
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the EU policy process in new rounds of agenda-setting, policy formulation and decision-making. These 
processes of conscious and strategic feedback are referred to as reloading (Figure 1), which means 
bringing implementation experiences to the table in order to influence agenda-setting with regard to new 
elements shaping a directive. This can generate 'new rules', but very often – and especially with 
framework constructs such as the WFD (Josefsson, 2015) – it can produce new guidelines, procedures or 
rules implementing the directive. Van Eerd et al. (2018) distinguish four crucial steps of reloading: (i) the 
acquisition by implementing agents of implementation experiences at the domestic level, (ii) the 
mobilisation by implementing agents and their representatives of such information across multiple levels 
of governance with the aim of setting the EU agenda, (iii) the receiving of these experiences by agents at 
the EU level, and (iv) the possible affecting (or active neutralising) of further EU policymaking by these 
experiences. 
Even though the importance of EU policy feedback has been widely acknowledged in the political 
sciences and in public administration, reloading has rarely been addressed systematically in EU 
implementation studies (Breeman and Zwaan, 2009; Treib, 2014). Analysing the reloading of 
implementation experiences into multilevel EU architectures with framework goals is important as this 
contributes to the transparency, practicability and legitimacy of EU policies. Furthermore, it is presumed 
that policies demonstrating a robust capacity to revise and improve regulatory frameworks on the go by 
learning from implementation experiences create more resilient governance (see Zeitlin, 2016). It is 
therefore important to understand the use of implementation experiences, as they contribute to the 
adaptive capacities needed in multilevel water governance, particularly in light of changing climatic 
conditions. 
In earlier studies (van Eerd et al., 2018), we have shown that the reloading of implementation 
experiences is influenced by both agency-based and structure-based conditions such as the ability 
(resources and capacity) and incentives of implementing agents to actively apply mobilisation strategies, 
the institutional setting that hinders or enables the reloading activities of these agents, and the openness 
and responsiveness of the EU policy process to such expertise (see also Dunlop and Radaelli, 2013; 
Kingdon, 2014; Palmer, 2015; Pierson, 1993). However, it is still unknown how certain policy 
characteristics may affect reloading. Although there can obviously be more variables at stake, in this 
contribution we specifically zoom in on policy discretion in relation to adaptation pressure, and how both 
affect the strategies of reloading implementation experiences (Figure 1). Policy discretion provides 
implementing agents with a certain control over, and 'room to manoeuvre' within, practical 
implementation (Dörrenbächer and Mastenbroek, 2017; Versluis et al., 2011). Reloading may also 
depend on the extent to which an agency must adapt to the new rules, or what the 'distance to target' is 
in light of the aims of the policy. In short, adaptation pressure is nearly as relevant as discretion in 
affecting agentsʼ incentives to mobilise implementation experiences. For a number of reasons, it is 
particularly interesting to study multilevel reloading in the unique EU setting: the large distance between 
EU policymakers and domestic implementing agents, the many actors and players involved, the fact that 
the EU does not have its own implementing agents, and the European Commissionʼs unique role as 
agenda-setter and policy formulator (Héritier, 1996; Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984; Treib, 2014; Young, 
2010). In addition, it is relevant to mention the iterative nature of decision-making of some of the EU 
directives. According to Sabel and Zeitlin (2012), the WFD, together with the Common Implementation 
Strategy (CIS) that guides its implementation, is a prime example of experimentalist governance in action. 
Its aim – the concept of good ecological status (or, for that matter, good ecological potential) – is open-
ended, "with methods, tools, metrics and values for its assessment to be developed through the 
implementation process" (ibid: 5), while the CIS secures ongoing reviews and updates with the help of 
technical guidance documents (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2012; Zeitlin, 2016). Reloading can take place in more 
iterative, experimentalist settings, but is in no way bound to that context. Implementation feedback is 
relevant in any multilevel policy context, and processes of reporting and evaluation provide opportunities 
to give feedback from the ground up in almost all EU policies. In this analysis, we highlight not so much 
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the ongoing iterative, but more the strategic, reloading of implementation experiences. In any case, EU 
institutions are eager to learn from practical implementation experiences, particularly in light of the EUʼs 
implementation deficit and legitimacy issues (European Commission, 2015, 2016; Interviews 14, 41, 54). 
The aim of this paper is to better understand the relationship between policy discretion, adaptation 
pressure and reloading (Figure 1). Hence, our central question is: in what way do policy discretion and 
adaptation pressure affect the reloading of implementation experiences in EU water governance? We 
focus on gaining a better understanding of the process of reloading, instead of aiming to grasp its 
outcomes. This paper is structured as follows: in the second section, we further elaborate on the link 
between policy discretion, adaptation pressure and incentives for reloading and, based on these insights, 
working hypotheses are formulated. We then describe the research methods chosen. The level of policy 
discretion of the WFD and FD are then compared, from which specific hypotheses are drawn. Subsequent 
to that, reloading of implementation experiences in both directives is addressed. Finally, we discuss the 
relevance of the hypotheses and present some concluding remarks. 
CONCEPTUALISING THE LINK BETWEEN POLICY DISCRETION, ADAPTATION PRESSURE AND RELOADING 
In this section we build on insights of traditional Europeanisation and policy process literature in order to 
better understand how variation in policy discretion eventually affects the strategic use of 
implementation experiences in the EU policy process. Figure 2 specifies the relationship between 
discretion, adaptation pressure and the reloading of implementation experiences. Insights derived in this 
section are used to generate three working hypotheses, which are addressed in the remainder of this 
paper. 
 Figure 2. Linking policy discretion, adaptation pressure and reloading. 
 
Policy discretion and adaptation pressure 
Policy discretion can be defined as the room left to lower levels of government in a policyʼs interpretation 
and implementation. In line with the subsidiarity principle, EU legislation regularly leaves certain issues 
to the discretion of member states in order to allow for specific national, regional or local circumstances 
(Franchino, 2007; Steunenberg and Toshkov, 2009). Variation in discretion, and in the conditions under 
which an EU policy delegates discretion to member states, has frequently been studied (e.g. Franchino, 
2007; Pollack, 1997; Thomson and Torenvlied, 2011). One can distinguish between different levels of 
discretion (Steunenberg and Toshkov, 2009). The level of discretion granted to member states has a 
significant effect on a policyʼs transposition and implementation, since it influences domestic agentsʼ 
control over practical implementation and compliance (Dimitrova and Steunenberg, 2013). Directives 
having a higher level of policy discretion are easier to transpose and implement, since they give member 
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states more implementation freedom. In such cases, implementing agents experience ample 
opportunities to adapt EU policies to domestic conditions (Steunenberg and Toshkov, 2009; Thomson, 
2007, 2009; Treib, 2014; Zhelyazkova and Torenvlied, 2009; Zhelyazkova, 2013). In this study we follow 
the commonly recognised idea that more policy discretion normally leads to less adaptation pressure, 
which makes the transposition and implementation of a policy easier. 
Adaptation pressure not only depends on the level of policy discretion, but also on the level of policy 
fit (Figure 2). Scholars focusing on the 'goodness of fit' hypothesis argue that smooth adaptation to, and 
successful compliance with, EU policies is assumed to depend on the degree to which such EU policies fit 
with existing national policies and institutions (Börzel and Risse, 2000; Duina, 1997; Héritier et al., 2001; 
Knill and Lenschow, 1998, 2000; Mastenbroek, 2005; Mastenbroek and Kaeding, 2006). Both discretion 
and fit affect the adaptation pressure which an implementing agent encounters during the stage of 
domestic policy implementation. Inherently, these policy characteristics affect the experiences of an 
implementing agent. 
Incentives for reloading 
Following both uploading and agenda-setting literature (e.g. Börzel, 2005; Héritier, 1996; Kingdon, 2014), 
one can distinguish a range of agentsʼ incentives for the uploading of preferences, knowledge and 
information to the EU policy process. Examples of these incentives are: minimising (new) implementation 
and adaptation costs; overcoming (future) implementation problems; first-mover advantages; 
establishing a European playing field for oneʼs industry; and, based on national legislation, promoting the 
adoption of more stringent EU policies (Héritier, 1996; Liefferink and Andersen, 1998). We expect similar 
incentives to play a role in the reloading of implementation experiences. In particular, an agentʼs interest 
in maintaining stability in the policy process or in reaching a certain level of policy change (i.e. instrument 
calibrations; changes to the set of policy instruments or instrument logic; changes to a policyʼs setting or 
to its objectives or goals) is expected to affect incentives for reloading practical implementation 
experiences. It is presumed that both adaptation pressure and discretion affect such incentives. 
The conceptualisation leads to the following working hypotheses (based on Figure 2):  
H1a: A low level of policy discretion and a low level of fit leads to a high adaptation pressure; this is 
expected to give a clear incentive to reload implementation experiences, aiming at changes in policy (in 
order to improve fit or expand discretion). 
H1b: A low level of policy discretion and a good fit leads to low adaptation pressure; this is expected to 
give a clear incentive to reload implementation experiences in order to keep the situation as it is, in other 
words, aiming at stabilising the policy (keeping the good fit as it is). 
H2: A high level of policy discretion is expected to lead to a low level of adaptation pressure, with either 
good or bad fit, and will give no incentive to reload at all. There is no necessity to reload with the aim of 
change or stability. 
The difference between low adaptation pressure with incentives to stabilise policies (H1b) and low 
adaptation while giving no incentive to reload experiences (H2) is that in a 'low discretion – good fit' (H1b) 
situation, agencies want to keep it that way: there is a risk that any change could lead to a less-good fit. 
In a situation with high discretion (H2), future change of a directive or its implementation rules – because 
of other reloading processes or the operations of other agents of change – would be less of a risk. So, in 
this case we donʼt expect that actors will have a great incentive to reload. 
RESEARCH METHODS 
In order to test our hypotheses, we have studied the reloading of implementation experiences for the 
WFD and FD. Selection of these directives can be explained, as both are cornerstones of current EU water 
governance, and the issues of water quality and quantity have been central topics on the EU water 
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agenda over recent decades (Kallis and Butler, 2001; Green et al., 2013). As the two directives are 
comparable for most policy characteristics yet vary with regard to the degree of policy discretion (see 
section 4), it makes it particularly interesting to compare the reloading processes of these specific 
directives. Since it is not feasible to study reloading in detail in all EU member states, we have chosen to 
analyse the reloading of implementation experiences in the Netherlands. This country has been selected 
as it has a long tradition of water management and can be seen as an active agent in addressing EU water 
governance issues (Bourblanc et al., 2013) and so the occurrence of various reloading activities can be 
expected. 
In the next section, we compare the level of policy discretion that both directives allow member states 
in the achievement of their overall goals. For assessing the level of policy discretion, we follow the 
approach applied by Steunenberg and Toshkov (2009). They first determine the number of a policyʼs 
substantive (sub-)articles that are relevant to member states and, secondly, they check whether each of 
these (sub)-articles contain a closed or more open statement. A closed statement prescribes precisely 
what a member state must do or cannot do, whereas open statements allow for such choices to be made 
by implementing agencies. Each article is classified as closed or open, based on the interpretation of the 
researcher. Next, the following index (Figure 3) can be made (Steunenberg and Toshkov, 2009): Di = 
Oi/(Oi+Ci) 
Dᵢ is the policyʼs discretion to (sub)national implementing agents, Cᵢ is the number of closed articles, 
and Oᵢ is the number of open articles. Based on this index, discretion has a value of between zero and 
one. The higher the outcome value, the more discretion a policy allows (Figure 3). The Directive 
2003/33/EC on Advertising and Sponsorship of Tobacco Products, for instance, is regarded as a very 
restrictive one (0.09), while the Directive 2002/44/EC on Exposure of Workers to Vibration (0.52) is seen 
as less restrictive (Steunenberg and Toshkov, 2009: 13). 
Following Steunenberg and Toshkov, we did not include in our calculations the commonly used final 
provisions of the WFD and the FD, which address issues like the policy addressees, transposition and 
entry into force. Inclusion of these rather closed statements, especially for directives having a small 
number of articles, would disproportionally reduce the discretion score (Steunenberg and Toshkov, 2009; 
958). For the WFD, we only focus on the articles dealing with ecology in its main legal text. We do not 
focus on the older related directives, nor on its daughter directives. Since only presenting a number as 
the result of a quantitative interpretation of legislative texts is not enough to fully understand the degree 
of discretion which an implementing agent experiences at street level, we also qualitatively describe the 
contents of articles, i.e. specification of goals, tools, measures, reporting and monitoring requirements. 
Subsequently, we have double checked if the variation in discretion level, as calculated by using the 
approach of Steunenberg and Toshkov, is also perceived by relevant actors. 
In order to get an understanding of the actual implementation experiences and reloading processes, 
we build on multiple data sets. First, scientific literature has been studied. Second, policy documents 
were thoroughly assessed, ranging from the directives themselves and related Common Implementation 
Strategy guidelines, to minutes of meetings and presentations at the EU and at national levels. Third, we 
base our analysis on 54 semi-structured interviews with staff members of the European Commission, 
(Dutch) domestic implementing agents, and stakeholder and member state representatives involved in 
the policy process of EU water governance.1 Interviews were held between October 2013 and July 2017, 
lasted from 45 minutes to over two hours, and were audio recorded and fully transcribed. Content 
analysis of the documents and interview transcripts was done by applying deductive coding, using our 
theoretical concepts: uploading, downloading, reloading, policy discretion, adaptation pressure and 
policy fit. In addition, the first author joined several EU working and expert group meetings, as well as 
discussion sessions concerning the implementation of the WFD and the FD in the Netherlands. 
                                                          
1 A more detailed overview of the interviewees can be found in Appendix I.  
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 POLICY DISCRETION IN THE WFD AND THE FD 
Key characteristics of the WFD and the FD 
Before clarifying what level of policy discretion both directives offer, we first give their key characteristics 
(see Table 1). The WFD, adopted in 2000, is the overarching piece of legislation that aims to improve 
water quality in all of Europeʼs aquatic environments. It introduces a new, integrated, ecosystem-based 
approach, and coordinates policies that were previously addressed separately. Important innovations are 
the introduction of the basin approach (the management of a river basin along hydrological boundaries), 
the introduction of water pricing, the obligations for public participation, and the focus on the setting of 
ecological objectives. Of central environmental concern are both surface water and groundwater bodies, 
which should have achieved a good ecological and chemical status by 2015. A key element of the WFD is 
the development of river basin management plans (RBMPs), which consist of a detailed account of how 
(ecological) objectives are to be reached within the timescale required. Each RBMP should be 
accompanied by a programme of measures, including a number of mandatory 'basic' measures.2 As 
member states are responsible for the directiveʼs transposition, application and enforcement, they are 
to a certain extent empowered to dictate the specifics of how to achieve the WFDʼs goals. The European 
Commission checks its compliance, yet there are several legislative loopholes that member states can 
exploit if they meet certain conditions, for instance they can extend the 2015 good ecological status 
deadline to 2021 or 2027 by using the argument that the 2015 deadline would result in disproportionate 
costs (Dieperink et al., 2012; Evers, 2012; Green et al., 2013; Griffiths, 2002; Interviews 32, 42, 52; Kaika 
and Page, 2003; Kallis and Butler, 2001; Page and Kaika, 2003; Wiering et al., 2009). 
Even though the WFD is often referred to as an integrated water policy, it addresses water quantity 
issues only to a limited extent. Attention to flood risk management (FRM) was raised following several 
(near) floods in various EU countries. In 2003, the downstream-located Netherlands and France jointly 
placed the importance of floods on the political agenda in Europe (Dworak and Görlach, 2005). The FD, 
adopted in 2007, aims to establish a framework for the assessment and management of flood risks in 
order to reduce the adverse consequences of floods. Member states should first carry out a preliminary 
assessment to classify areas at risk of flooding (Article 4). For such zones, member states need to produce 
flood risk and hazard maps (Article 6), as well as integrated FRM plans (FRMPs) (Article 7) (Directive 
2007/60/EC; Evers and Nyberg, 2013; van Eerd et al., 2015). However, specific requirements on how to 
fulfil the assessment, maps and plans have not been formally set out. 
Both the WFD and the FD can be classified as experimentalist governance (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2012), as 
they are examples of "framework rulemaking and revision through recursive review of implementation 
experience in different local contexts" (ibid: 3). In order to structure such review processes, a Common 
Implementation Strategy has been set up, involving two meetings of water directors per year that are co-
chaired by the presidency (a member state representative conforming with the nationality of the 
presidency of the Council of Ministers) and the European Commission (Interviews 2, 5, 7, 10, 11, 12, 15, 
24, 27, 31, 49, 50,54; Josefsson, 2015: 240). These meetings are prepared at a lower level, in specific 
working and ad hoc groups. 
Obviously, the object of regulation of the two directives differs as the WFD focuses on water quality 
issues and the FD addresses FRM. By definition, political and societal attention varies for these respective 
objects. FRM, for instance, is affected by agentsʼ risk and safety perceptions, and the issue of flooding is 
often more sensitive and visible in comparison with ecological issues. Similarly, policy intention differs 
between the two directives as well. Despite these differences one can also identify several similarities, 
such as the comparable policy instruments which are required, i.e. management plans. Furthermore, 
                                                          
2 These are clearly described in the WFD and consist of, for instance, the implementation of all other relevant EU legislation for 
the protection of water, and the implementation of pollution control and protective measures (Kallis and Butler, 2001; Wiering 
et al., 2009).  
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similar cyclical six-year planning processes can be recognised, and both stimulate public participation and 
stakeholder involvement. Their geographical focus is also similar, i.e. the river basin as a unit; both 
policies also address a wide range of actors in multiple sectors, i.e. spatial planning, water management, 
industry and agriculture. Moreover, an overlap of legal and planning instruments can be found when 
studying the member statesʼ daily implementation (Evers, 2012; Priest et al., 2016; Interviews 1, 12, 17, 
19, 23, 43). In the Netherlands, the same authorities are concerned with the implementation of both 
directives (Interviews 16, 20, 24, 43, 53) (Table 1). 
Table 1. Key characteristics of the WFD and the FD.  





Water quality management Flood risk management 
Policy 
objective 
Reaching a good ecological and chemical 
status on all surface water bodies and a 
good quantitative and chemical status 
for groundwater bodies 
Assessment and 










Specific ecological quality standard must 
be met; list of parameters; some 
methods, ecological goals and standards 
are defined 
No specific quantitative goal; 
qualitative goal: level of risk 
should be reduced; up to the 
member states/local and 
regional levels to define 
regulation/norms for risk 
Time scale Clear milestones: 2000-2015, 2021-2027 Clear milestones: 2007- 2015, 
2021-2027 
Reporting Required Required 
Monitoring Monitoring of the water status is 
required 
No monitoring required 
Enforcement The Commission may start an 
infringement procedure at the European 
Court of Justice. The latter has the power 
to impose financial penalties (Article 258, 
TFEU). In addition, the WFD also specifies 
in Article 23 that member states should 
develop sanctions which are applicable 
on the national level, to make sure the 
WFD is properly implemented 
The Commission may start an 
infringement procedure at 
the European Court of 
Justice; the latter has the 
power to impose financial 
penalties (Article 258, TFEU) 
Exemptions Several possible exemptions from the 
obligation to attain good status for all 
water bodies in 2015 (i.e. Article 4.4, 4.5, 
4.6, 4.7) 
None 
Policy discretion score 0.235 0.5 
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Policy discretion of the WFD and FD 
The WFD offers less policy freedom than does the FD. For the WFD we calculated a score of 0.235,3 and 
for the FD a score of 0.5.4 This difference was also perceived by our interviewees (Interviews 3, 4, 6, 7, 
12, 15, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 30, 34, 39, 47). However, this calculation does not demonstrate the specific, 
deviating elements of discretion in both directives. Since implementing agents are directly concerned 
with these elements when implementing the policy on the ground, it is relevant to clarify them. Even 
though both the WFD and the FD are framework directives, the strength and specification of obligations 
varies considerably. The WFD uses more substantive requirements than do the FDʼs procedural 
obligations (Keessen and van Rijswick, 2012; Priest et al., 2016). Although the WFD has often been 
referred to as a flexible framework – or 'new generation' directive – which leaves considerable room for 
implementation (Jordan et al., 2003; Knill and Lenschow, 2000; Knill and Liefferink, 2007; Liefferink et al., 
2011), several parts of this directive do not tolerate much discretion. The WFD requires member states 
to set specific targets and end goals for water bodies, which further decreases the implementation 
freedom of implementing agents. An example is the obligatory ecological goal-setting process at the 
domestic level (Liefferink et al., 2011). The WFD also has an explicit obligation to ensure that water bodies 
should not experience a 'deterioration in status'. There is no commensurate specification in the FD, where 
no specific quantitative goals are formalised and the central objective only concerns the qualitative and 
rather abstract stipulation that flood risk levels should decrease. This objective is not further specified, 
as types of floods differ markedly across Europe and the risk and consequences of such flood events 
depend on local and regional circumstances (Evers and Nyberg, 2013; Newig et al., 2014; Wiering et al., 
2009; Interviews 10, 11, 13, 18, 30). The FDʼs procedural obligations leave room for member states to 
take national circumstances and policies into account, to decide upon their own FRM objectives and the 
prioritisation of specific measures (Directive 2007/60/EC: Article 7.2; Mostert and Junier, 2009; Priest et 
al., 2016). In addition, while both directives require reporting on progress and the obligation to monitor, 
enforcement is only explicitly mentioned in the WFD (Evers and Nyberg, 2013; Wiering et al., 2009). Once 
member states have committed themselves in their RBMPs to a specific set of objectives and measures, 
the EU will enforce its achievement within the time frames indicated (Wiering et al., 2009). Yet, the WFD 
also includes exemptions, for example for extending deadlines, such as Article 4.4, 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7 
(Directive 2000/60/EC). In comparison, the FD is so open and flexible that it does not include such 
exemptions (Herman, 2010; Howarth, 2007). Setting common EU standards for flood protection was 
considered politically and technically infeasible, due to the lower legal competences of the EU in the field 
of FRM and spatial planning, as compared to managing ecological water challenges and the varying nature 
of flood risk across Europe (Priest et al., 2016; Interviews 11, 30, 41, 51). 
Based on our comparison, we expect Hypotheses 1a and 1b to be confirmed in the WFDʼs reloading 
cases, and we expect the cases of reloading of the FD to be in line with Hypothesis 2. On the one hand, 
as suggested in H1a, the WFDʼs lower level of policy discretion in combination with high adaptation 
pressure will contribute to a strong reloading incentive for changing the ongoing policy process in line 
with domestic interests. On the other hand, as in Hypothesis 1b, when the WFD easily fits the domestic 
                                                          
3 We have coded the following WFD articles as open: 1, 4, 12, 23. Article 4 may be very closed concerning the good chemical 
status, but with regard to ecological status (which is the focus of this article) member states have quite some discretion. It is 
therefore coded as open. The following WFD articles were coded as closed: 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 24. Article 14, for 
example, requires that member states involve the public and gives specifications on how to do so. The following articles are not 
included in the calculations: 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 25, 26, and the annex. These articles are not (directly) addressing the 
member states. Therefore, the calculation is as follows: 4 (open articles)/4 (open articles) + 13 (closed articles) = 0.235.  
4 We have coded the following FD articles as open: 1, 2, 5, 7, 8, 9, 13. Article 5, for example, states that member states shall 
identify areas for which they conclude that potential significant flood risks exist. This article is coded as open, since specific 
requirements on the required identification process and the meaning of significant flood risk are open for interpretation by the 
member state itself. Articles 3, 4, 6, 10, 14, 15 and 17 are coded as closed. For example, Article 14 clearly outlines what a member 
state should do at what point in time. Articles 11, 12, 16, 18, 19 and the annex were excluded from the calculation. Therefore, 
the calculation is as follows: 7 (open articles)/7 (open articles) + 7 (closed articles) = 0.5.  
Water Alternatives - 2019  Volume 12 | Issue 3 
Van Eerd et al.: EU water governance and the Netherlands  Page | 895 
context, and adaptation pressure is relatively low and is combined with a low level of policy discretion, 
one can expect implementing agents to actively reload their experiences in order to 'keep it as it is'. This 
will lead to maintaining the status quo and the stabilisation of policies. In contrast, as Hypothesis 2 states, 
the FDʼs higher level of discretion is expected to lead to no necessity for reloading. 
IMPLEMENTATION EXPERIENCES AND RELOADING OF THE WFD IN THE NETHERLANDS 
As the WFD requires member states to set up comprehensive institutions and procedures for the control 
of the chemical and ecological quality of water bodies in Europe, its implementation turned out to be a 
lengthy and difficult process. Several implementation struggles can be identified, such the determination 
of water bodies and interpretation difficulties concerning principles and concepts (Bourblanc et al., 2013; 
Interviews 8, 16, 21, 22, 42, 43; van der Arend et al., 2011). Help and guidance was provided at the EU 
level to deal with implementation difficulties in a process of joint implementation and intercalibration. 
This has taken place, in particular, through the CIS (Interviews 12, 14, 35, 36, 41, 45, 46, 50, 52; 
Santbergen, 2013; Wiering et al., 2009). 
The WFDʼs goals and principles were first transposed in the Netherlands in the WFD Implementation 
Act in 2003. In 2009, a new and fully integrated Water Management Act (Water Wet) came into force. 
The WFD is implemented in the Netherlands in a decentralised water governance system. While the 
Ministry of Infrastucture and Water Management is in the end responsible, the regional water authorities 
and the Ministryʼs Public Works Department (Rijkswaterstaat) have to take the lead in setting the targets 
and implementing appropriate measures (Uitenboogaart et al., 2009; Interviews 8, 9, 24). For the WFDʼs 
implementation the Dutch chose a pragmatic approach, after a major parliamentary battle was triggered 
by an alarmist consultancy report commissioned by the Ministry of Agriculture, and a heavy lobbying 
campaign by farm and business organisations. According to this report, WFD measures would limit 
economic and agricultural activities (Behagel, 2012; Van der Arend et al., 2011). The modestly ambitious 
approach of the Netherlands (and other member states) was also the result of a lack of knowledge about 
the behaviour of the natural water system, financial limitations and high implementation costs, mutual 
dependencies between responsible implementing agencies, poor fits with other EU directives like the 
Habitats and the Birds Directives (79/409/EEC and 92/43/EEC), and public participation problems. In the 
Netherlands in particular, fear of potential legal complications of setting high ecological standards also 
restricted an ambitious implementation (Dieperink et al., 2012). The Dutch used the WFDʼs exemptions 
to extend the deadline for reaching the objectives from 2015 to 2027 (Directive 2000/60/EC; Ligtvoet et 
al., 2008; Uitenboogaart et al., 2009). 
We expect that the relatively low level of policy discretion the WFD offers implementing actors will 
stimulate Dutch incentives to reload. Furthermore, we expect the adaptation pressure that was 
experienced to be influential in steering the incentive to reload in the direction of change or stability, i.e. 
Hypotheses 1a and 1b. These hypotheses are tested in two specific cases of reloading implementation 
experiences. The first concerns the determination of the ecological potential of waterbodies and the 
second concerns the reporting requirements member states must meet. 
Good ecological potential 
Following the WFDʼs requirements, the Dutch identified a large proportion of their water bodies as 
heavily modified (42%) or artificial (53%) (European Commission, 2007; Liefferink et al., 2011; 
Uitenboogaart et al., 2009). Identifying a water body as artificial or heavily modified means that, for these 
bodies, a 'good ecological potential' (GEP) instead of a 'good ecological status' should be reached, which 
allows for relatively more policy discretion in setting ecological goals. However, the rather theoretical 
and technical measurement approach for determining a water bodyʼs GEP was considered to be too strict 
and caused implementation difficulties in practice (Interviews 16, 17, 22, 42, 52, 53). Dutch regional water 
managers experienced difficulties because of the GEPʼs ambiguous definition, because the GEP is defined 
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as a deviation from a theoretical reference situation, and because implementing agents lacked the 
required knowledge about pristine and reference conditions of water bodies as well as their restoration 
potential. Furthermore, the prescribed GEP approach did not fit the daily governance approach of Dutch 
actors. Combined, these factors resulted in a relatively high adaptation pressure being experienced by 
Dutch regional water authorities (Borja and Elliot, 2007; Carr and Crosnier, 2005; Interviews 5, 8, 9, 16, 
19) (Figure 4). The implementation experiences were exchanged and combined by regional agents and 
national key actors at several collaboration platforms. The national actors strategically shared this issue 
at the CIS water director level, in the hope of changing the GEP determination method into a method 
which took an inventory of feasible measures as a starting point. Eventually, the more pragmatic 
approach suggested by these Dutch agents became formalised in a CIS guidance document (CIS, 2009; 
Hering et al., 2010; Interviews 14, 15, 42, 54). 
Figure 4. Policy discretion, adaptation pressure, and reloading in the GEP case. 
 
Reporting requirements 
An important element of the WFD is its requirement to report (Article 15), that is, the requirement to 
send the RBMPs to the Commission and report progress concerning the implementation of planned 
measures. Adaptation pressure experienced by Dutch implementing agents in this case was relatively 
high, as clear deadlines for reporting were set and EU enforcement is based on reporting outcomes. 
However, details on what exactly to report and how to organise this reporting were lacking, which caused 
implementation difficulties in the Netherlands and in other member states (Interviews 16, 22, 24, 30, 41, 
44, 48, 52, 53). Experiences concerning this lack of clarity were shared by Dutch representatives in the 
EU CIS Data and Information Sharing (DIS) working group, with the incentive to change and clarify existing 
reporting practices. (Figure 5). The Dutch found support for their reporting practices among several other 
member states. Based on reporting difficulties expressed in the DIS working group, the Commission 
decided to develop a common reporting system, which was called the Water Information System for 
Europe (WISE). This system would harmonise and ease national reporting and, in addition, would enable 
EU-wide assessment as data provided would become more comparable. During the development of this 
system, Dutch representatives reloaded technical expertise to ensure that the newly developed system 
would fit existing domestic practices, which would lead to less work, fewer implementation costs and no 
need to develop new practices (Interviews 14, 16, 17, 22, 24, 43; CIS, 2009). 
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Figure 5. Policy discretion, adaptation pressure, and reloading in the reporting case. 
 
IMPLEMENTATION EXPERIENCES AND RELOADING OF THE FD IN THE NETHERLANDS 
In 2009, the FD was also transposed in the Water Management Act (Priest et al., 2016). Similar to the set-
up established for implementing the WFD, the functionally decentralised water governance system of 
the Netherlands assigns practical implementation responsibilities concerning the FD to a wide range of 
actors (van Eerd et al., 2015). In the Netherlands, adaptation pressure and the effect of the FD on national 
FRM policy has been minimal, which can be explained simply by the goodness of fit between the FD and 
existing institutionalised domestic FRM policy and practice. A synergy was perceived between the FDs 
and Dutch framings and perceptions on FRM (i.e. the solidarity principle and the principle of good 
neighbourliness, and river basin management) (van Eerd et al., 2017; Priest et al., 2016; Interviews 1, 3, 
10, 11, 12, 13, 20). 
The Dutch shared their implementation experiences with other member states in the working group 
on floods, which is one of the working groups of the WFD CIS structure. In comparison with the WFDʼs 
CIS groups, this working group consists of a small, committed, stable, clearly delineated and involved 
group of actors, being primarily experts and governmental representatives. This expert-oriented setting 
creates a learning atmosphere (Interviews 11, 12, 20, 30, 31, 38, 51, 53) in which discussions are less 
formal and concern primarily technical issues: "Acts of lobby[ing] are less usual in the Floods group as the 
discussions are primarily of a technical nature" (Interview 31). Moreover, "the diversity of FRM 
approaches fitting the FDʼs scope enables the learning possibilities in the working group" (Interview 53). 
We expect that, due to its high level of policy discretion and resulting low adaptation pressure, there 
is no incentive for reloading (as suggested in Hypothesis 2). To test this hypothesis, we elaborate on the 
map grids and scales case, and on the case of the definition of significant flood risks 
Map grids and scales 
One important requirement of the FD is the development of flood risk and hazard maps for areas 
identified as vulnerable to floods. Adaptation pressure for such mapping is relatively low, since not many 
specific obligations are set. One result is that the scales of maps used in the EU vary significantly, e.g. for 
Brandenburg (Germany) the scale is 1: 2500, in the Netherlands it is 1: 50,000 and for the Serchio River 
in Italy it is 1: 75,000 (Suykens, 2015; Nones, 2015; van Rijswick et al., 2010). The development of more 
detailed requirements and guidance for mapping was discussed in the CIS working group on floods. In 
reaction to a Commission proposal of a 5-by-5-metre grid level for FRM mapping, Dutch representatives 
responded by showing that a 100-by-100-metre grid would better fit mapping practices at the member 
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state level. Based on the daily experiences shared by Dutch regional implementing agents at several 
regional and national platforms (for example, at regular IMPRO (Implementatie Richtlijn 
Overstromingsrisicoʼs) meetings),5 the Dutch representatives at the EU level were able to argue that a 
too-small grid level would not be appropriate (Interviews 1, 10, 11, 12, 13, 20, 31). As the discussion was 
open, and a good fit already existed, there was no need to change or stabilise the policy process (Figure 
6). Dutch experiences with map grids were used for learning purposes, and member states from 
particularly Eastern Europe were eager to learn from long-term Dutch experience in mapping flood risks 
(Interviews 3, 13, 38, 51, 53, 54). 
Figure 6. Policy discretion, adaptation pressure, and reloading in the case of FRM mapping. 
 
Defining a 'significant flood risk' 
The lack of EU-wide consensus about important FD definitions and concepts – in particular the room left 
to member states for delineating a 'significant flood risk' – led to interpretation difficulties and heated 
discussions among implementing agents in the Netherlands (Mostert and Junier, 2009; Van Eerd et al., 
2015). Experiences, definitions and approaches of member states to this determination were exchanged 
in the CIS working group on floods (Interviews 1, 4, 7, 11, 12, 20, 23, 30). The Dutch presented their 
definition of a significant flood risk as "[a flood] that cause[s] fatalities and/or that cause[s] major societal 
disruptions" (STOWA, 2016). In comparison to the definition of flood risk in Article 2 of the FD ("the 
combination of the probability of a flood event and of the potential adverse consequences for human 
health, the environment, cultural heritage and economic activity associated with a flood event"), the 
Dutch definition is rather minimalistic. No common definition or guidance document was agreed upon as 
the subsidiarity principle was considered more important, however learning took place between member 
states. Several representatives, particularly those from Eastern European member states, mentioned that 
the experiences of the Dutch facilitated their understanding of the FD (Interviews 51, 53, 54). 
                                                          
5 IMPRO meetings are an important venue for discussions about FRM between actors from the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure 
and Environment, Rijkswaterstaat, the provinces, safety regions and the union of regional water authorities.  
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Both the WFD and FD cases showed that reloading starts as a bottom-up process, and practical 
implementation experiences are mobilised strategically across multiple levels of governance. Domestic 
experiences are shared in workshops via letters and notes, bilateral conversations, presentations and 
conferences. The WFDʼs CIS network stimulated the continual exchange of implementation experiences 
by providing the required reloading venues in both the FDʼs and WFDʼs policy process. However, the 
characteristics of the floods working group were slightly different from the WFD-related groups: they 
were less politicised, were engaged in more technical discussions, and were a smaller group with a clear 
learning atmosphere. We also saw that, for both directives, the European Commission is keen on learning 
from domestic experiences to improve its implementation across the EU. In some cases, the Commission 
even organises specific consultations or bilateral meetings with member statesʼ representatives for the 
exchange of implementation experiences (Interviews 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 15, 29, 41, 45, 49, 54). 
We assumed that the characteristics of the directives themselves in terms of policy discretion and 
adaptation pressure would affect incentives for reloading of implementation experiences. In Table 2 we 
have specified our three hypotheses, and Table 3 shows our case study findings. 
Following our hypotheses, we expected reloading to take place in the WFD cases due to the lower 
level of policy discretion. We assumed that this lower level of implementation freedom would trigger 
mobilising agents to strategically reload their expertise in order to maintain the status quo or to achieve 
change in line with their domestic interests. The incentive to maintain the status quo or to change would 
depend on the adaptation pressure experienced by an agent (Hypotheses 1a and 1b). WFD cases indeed 
confirmed that Dutch representatives mobilised domestic implementation experiences up to the EU level 
in order to ensure that the ongoing policy process and the WFDʼs further implementation would fit their 
domestic preferences and concerns. Discussions during reloading processes have both a technical and 
politicised nature. They were initiated when a certain level of friction was experienced between EU policy 
and the daily implementation practice of water management, which is more common in cases of little 
implementation freedom. These cases illustrate that incentives for WFD reloading show an overlap with 
incentives mentioned in initial uploading and agenda-setting literature, i.e. minimising implementation 
and adaptation costs, overcoming (future) implementation problems, and first-mover advantages 
(Héritier, 1996; Liefferink and Andersen, 1998). The rationale identified was often an agentʼs self-interest. 
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Table 2. Policy discretion, adaptation pressure, and reloading: three hypotheses.  
 Policy discretion Level of fit Adaptation 
pressure 
Expected reloading  
H1a low low high aiming at change 
H1b low high low aiming at stabilisation 
H2 high low or high low no reloading 





















WFD: Reporting case medium unclear high aiming at 
change 
  
FD: Map grids and 
scales 






significant flood risks 





We presumed, however, that for the FD cases one would not find much reloading, as no necessity exists 
for mobilising agents due to the openness and flexibility of this directive (Hypothesis 2). Even though the 
FDʼs implementation freedom and the good fit to domestic practices contributed to low adaptation 
pressure, it is remarkable that Dutch representatives still gathered together and exchanged their 
implementation experiences concerning mapping and defining (among other things) 'significant flood 
risk' in EU venues. The studied cases show that information exchange, interaction and debates for the FD 
cases were primarily driven by idealism. The Dutch wanted to share their long tradition of FRM with other 
states and, in return, to learn from other actorsʼ interpretations and best practices. This was also driven 
by a sense of urgency to improve FRM practices across the EU. Implementing agents are dedicated simply 
to the cause of water management. This means that these reloading activities were driven by the 
emphasis that policymaking and implementation are a form of collective questioning on societyʼs behalf 
and that implementation experiences can contribute to this solution. Hence, Hypothesis 2 has been 
falsified. 
Our analysis also made clear that the Water Framework Directive, despite being a framework 
construct (Josefsson, 2015) and despite its iterative and experimentalist character (Sabel and Zeitlin, 
2012) leads to considerably less policy discretion and a higher level of adaptation pressure than the 
Floods Directive. Based on this, we argue that interactionist and iterative governance, as such, does not 
lead to high policy discretion and less adaptation pressure as long as implementation agents are bound 
to procedures and processes of calibration, monitoring and discussion in an EU context. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This study focused on reloading processes of implementation experiences in the domain of EU water 
governance. 
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Our analysis has revealed that agents can have multiple reasons for such reloading, ranging from 
favouring domestic interests (i.e. lowering implementation costs, overcoming implementation problems, 
and ensuring a better policy fit) to the idealism of social learning (i.e. establishing better water 
management practices or improving environmental conditions across the EU). Looking back at our central 
question, we conclude that policy discretion and adaptation pressure affect an implementing agentʼs 
experiences and, subsequently, indeed affect its incentives for being active in reloading implementation 
experiences across multiple levels of governance. However, when an agent has no self-related incentive 
to reload, reloading activities still might take place due to more idealistic reasons. 
Building on our explorative study, several important topics for future research can be discerned. The 
first relates to the role of other policy characteristics in processes of reloading, such as the nature of the 
policy domain (water management, agriculture, nature conservation, etc) and the addressees of the 
measures to be taken. In the cases studied, addressees were primarily state governance agents; however, 
what if they were farmers or business organisations? These actors could also reload their experiences 
and mobilise their lobbies at the EU level. A second topic relates to the role of the characteristics of the 
policy domain under scrutiny. In comparison with other EU environmental domains, water governance 
has often been referred to as a relatively open policy field. This is due to, for instance, its extensive public 
access for information and the multiple (CIS) venues and channels through which new actors can engage 
(Moss, 2004; Princen, 2010; Richardson, 1994; Wiering et al., 2009). It would also be interesting to study 
reloading processes in other policy domains, such as the more politicised Common Agricultural Policy and 
the more specific air quality legislation. Furthermore, it is important to realise that other variables affect 
reloading processes as well, such as the domestic and EU institutional structure and the ability and 
capacity of implementing agents involved. And finally, it would obviously be helpful to broaden the 
testing of our hypotheses to more, if not all, member states. We think that our study constitutes a good 
start in systematically investigating the processes of reloading that take place after uploading and 
downloading of EU policies. 
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APPENDIX 1: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
No.  Date and location Function and/or organisation 
1 4 October 2013, phone Policy official (FD), Public Works Department 
2 7 October 2013, The 
Hague 
Former Head of Water Management, Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and 
Environment 
3 17 October 2013, phone Policy official (FD) in North Rhine Westphalia 
4 18 October 2013, phone Policy official, German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature 
Conservation and Nuclear Safety  
5 18 October 2013, phone Policy official, Public Works Department 
6 6 February 2015, skype Consultant, Fresh Thoughts Consulting  
7 24 February 2015, skype Policy official, Irish Office of Public Works and Flood Relief (risk management 
division), Former co-chair of the EU working group on floods 
8 27 February 2015, Utrecht Policy official (WFD), Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment 
9 2 March 2015, Breda Policy official, Dutch Water Authority, Brabantse Delta 
10 6 March 2015, phone Policy official (FD), Public Works Department 
11 19 March 2015, The 
Hague 
Policy official (FD), Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment 
12 2 March 2015, phone Staff member, European Commission (FD)  
13 15 October 2015, The 
Hague 
Policy official (FD), Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment 
14 28 January 2016, skype Consultant, Fresh Thoughts Consulting 
15 4 February 2016, Brussels Staff member, European Commission (FD and WFD) 
16 12 February 2016, Utrecht Policy official (WFD), Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment 
17 16 February 2016, Utrecht Policy official (FD and WFD), Public Works Department 
18 17 February 2016, phone Consultant supporting the implementation of the Floods Directive in the 
Netherlands 
19 24 February 2016, The 
Hague 
Representative, Dutch Union of Regional Water Authorities 
20 25 February 2016, phone Policy official (FD), Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment 
21 9 March 2016, Zwolle Consultant, involved with WFD implementation at regional level in the 
Netherlands 
22 10 March 2016, phone Policy official (WFD), Public Works Department  
23 23 March 2016, phone Policy official, German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature 
Conservation and Nuclear Safety 
24 7 April 2016, phone Policy official (FD and WFD), Public Works Department 
25 8 April 2016, The Hague Representative, Bureau Brussels 
26 19 April 2016, phone Policy official, Scottish Environment Protection Agency 
27 25 April 2016, skype Official of EurEau 
28 28 April 2016, phone Policy official, Federal ministry for Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and 
Water Management in Austria 
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29 13 May 2016, phone Policy official, House of the Dutch Provinces 
30 13 May 2016, phone Staff member, European Commission (FD)  
31 01 May 2016, phone Austrian policy official, co-chair of the EU Working Group on Floods 
32 11 August 2016, phone Policy official, Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment  
33 16 August 2016, 's 
Graveland 
Official of Natuurmonumenten (NGO) 
34 24 August 2016, Paris Policy official, French Ministry for Ecology, Sustainable Development and 
Energy 
35 25 August 2016, phone Official, Wassernetz NRW (NGO) 
36 30 August 2016, phone Policy official, Federal Environment Agency, Germany 
37 1 September 2016, phone Member of the European Anglers Alliance and Angling Trust, UK 
38 9 September 2016, Lync Policy official, Swedish Agency for Marine and Water Management 
39 12 September 2016, skype Official, European Environmental Bureau 
40 29 September 2016, skype Official of World Association for Waterborne Transport Infrastructure (PIANC) 
41 30 September 2016, 
phone 
Staff member, European Commission (FD and WFD) 
42 04 October 2016, phone Policy official (WFD), Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment 
43 5 October 2016, phone Policy official (WFD and FD), Public Works Department 
44 11 October 2016, phone Policy official, Le Service Public de Wallonie 
45 12 October 2016, phone Policy official, Public Works Department 
46 14&17 October 2016, 
skype 
Member of WssTP and Water Alliance 
47 19 October 2016, phone Policy official, Flemish Environment Agency 
48 19 October 2016, phone Official of Nature and Biodiversity Conservation Union (NABU) 
49 28 November 2016, skype Consultant on (EU) water governance. Former staff member of the European 
Commission (WFD and FD) 
50 13 December 2016, 
Voorburg 
Former policy official at the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment 
51 14 December 2016, phone Austrian policy official, co-chair of the EU Working Group on Floods 
52 16 December 2016, 
Utrecht 
Policy official (WFD and FD), Public Works Department 
53 02 February 2017, phone Policy official (FD) at Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment 
54 13 July 2017, phone Staff member, European Commission 
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